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Attached comment

End 71 today

As you see we are concerned with overall operational security.

Certainly we understand,

I think, your basic notion of trying to get ops going into Estonia. I see where assets, even such as ALROTT/5, may be hard to find! You must use

what you have and the problem is a very real one. Believe you

can use the 7mer, however, so that we don't in a year or two have to try to analyze why x agent blown or picked up and find it stems from ALROTT/5.

If you disagree or if you feel this needs discussion with 71 or us alone, pls let me know.

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SOURCE METHOD EXEMPTION 3B2B
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2007

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S E C R E T

CI Staff comment re project AEROOT :

Concur renewal but we note the obvious operational security hazards involved in using AEROOT/5.

The real question appears to be the wisdom of attempting to use the proposed device of an operational "cover" based on the Estonian Central Committee with an alias. Certainly this "cover" and the use of an alias can be of only temporary worth and limited security assistance. It will not solve the basic problem of AEROOT/5's use since this use problem stems from KGB identification of him, the fact that he has and is known for what he is, and, of course, his relative prominence in Estonian emigre affairs.

The most important consideration is that we should not assume that this "cover" has provided protection when and if any recruitment is attempted after AEROOT/5, using an alias, has assessed an individual. The use of the "cover" and an alias should be viewed as only a temporary device to permit initial access to a target if this is required. If we assume that AEROOT/5's identity can be hidden we run a definite risk of deluding ourselves and improperly assessing the risks to any REDSKIN agent dispatched after contact with AEROOT/5.

Pertinent to the above considerations is the fact that AEROOT/5 has been the target of a KGB recruitment attempt (in 1957) and of continuing interest to the KGB. His position as editor of an Estonian newspaper makes this natural and makes the problem of "cover" on any sustained basis difficult if not impossible. There is then the concern that AEROOT/5 will continue to be a Soviet target and always the possibility that individuals will be exposed to AEROOT/5 for his assessment as part of a provocation attempt by the Soviets. As mentioned above we cannot see where the "cover" will provide more than temporary device nor can we see how the same "cover" can be used for any length of time.

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CI/OPS/BOVSAT
1 March 1960